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Focusing on the U.S. and the E.U., this essay seeks to advance four main 
propositions.  First, the incidence of the short-run costs of programs to subsidize 
the generation of electricity from renewable sources varies with the organization 
of the electric power industry, and this variation is may be a significant 
contributor to their political attractiveness in U.S. states.  Second, despite the 
greater popularity of feed-in-tariff schemes worldwide, renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS) programs may involve less long-run social risk under plausible 
conditions.  Third, in contrast to the E.U.’s approach to reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions, its renewables program is almost certain not to minimize the cost of 
achieving its goals.  Fourth, the array of state RPS programs in the U.S. are also 
almost certain to cost more than necessary, even though most employ market 
mechanisms.  To support this last point I provide a fairly detailed description of 
actual markets for renewable energy credits (RECs) and their shortcomings.   
Introduction 
At the start of 2010, eighty-three nations and all U.S. states had policies to promote the 
generation of electricity from energy deemed “renewable,” typically defined to exclude large-
scale hydroelectric facilities (REN21 2010, National Research Council 2010 (Appendix D)).  As 
of May 2011, twenty-nine U.S. states2 and the District of Columbia (referred to a state in what 
follows for simplicity) have enacted renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies for this purpose 
(generally along with other policies). (Unless explicitly noted, all statements in this article about 
                                                 
1 This paper was written for the Review of Environmental Economics and Policy.  It began as a plenary talk at the 4th 
World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists in Montreal in June 2010.  I am indebted to audiences 
there, at Michigan State University, at the University of Michigan, and at the MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research for helpful comments.  I am also indebted to the editor, two referees, Galen Barbose, 
Harry Durrwachter, Gunnar Ellefsen, William Hogan, Ed Holt, Henry Jacoby, Thomas Lyon, John Norden, Lars 
Kvale, Ignacio Perez-Arriaga, Robert Stavins, Christian Thalacker, Xiang Ling Yap, and Ryan Wiser for 
informative conversations and comments.  I am further indebted to Xiang Ling Yap for superb research assistance, 
to Christian Thalacker for making the Spectron data available, and to Ryan Wise and Galen Barbose for providing 
the Evolution Markets data.  All remaining defects and all opinions are, of course, mine alone. 
 
2 These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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U.S. federal and state policies in support of renewables are based on the online DSIRE database 
(http://www.dsireusa.org/) and links from it to state and federal online resources.)   RPS policies 
are quantity-based and generally require that a minimum fraction of electricity demand be met by 
renewable energy.  These policies typically require load-serving entities to obtain renewable 
energy credits (RECs), produced by state-certified renewable generators in proportion to their 
output, equal to at least a minimum fraction of their retail sales.  Bills that would impose a 
nationwide RPS have twice passed the U.S. House of Representatives since 2007. 
 Outside the U.S., feed-in Tariff (FIT) policies have been much more popular.  FIT 
policies are price-based and generally require that electricity generated from renewable energy 
be purchased at a fixed, premium price.  FIT policies were employed by fifty nations at the start 
of 2010, while only ten used RPS.  In contrast, FITs have been very little used by U.S. states and 
have received essentially no recent attention at the federal level (Couture et al 2010).  Since 1992 
federal support of renewable generation has mainly involved tax credits that provide per-kWh 
subsidies of generation or fractional subsidies of up-front capital cost (Schmalensee 2010).  The 
adverse incentive effects of subsidizing capital cost are clear; the shortcomings of providing 
subsidies in the form of tax credits are also serious.  This approach generally requires renewable 
generation developers, who rarely have enough taxable income to make use of tax credits, to 
partner with one of a few large tax-paying financial institutions who are willing to serve as “tax 
equity” providers (Bipartisan Policy Center 2011).  Forming such partnerships raises costs 
significantly, with no social benefit.   
 Focusing on the U.S. and the E.U., this essay seeks to advance four main propositions.  
First, the short-run incidence of the costs of subsidies to renewable generation depends on the 
organization of the electric power industry and may be a significant contributor to the political 
attractiveness of such subsidies.  Second, despite the greater popularity of FIT schemes 
worldwide, RPS programs may involve less long-run social risk under plausible conditions.  
Third, in contrast to the E.U.’s approach to reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, its 
renewables program is almost certain not to minimize the cost of achieving the program’s goals.  
Fourth, the array of state RPS programs in the U.S. are also almost certain to cost more than 
necessary, even though most employ “market mechanisms.”  To support this last point I provide 
a fairly detailed description of actual markets for renewable energy credits (RECs) and their 
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shortcomings.  A final section offers a summary of the main conclusions and implications of this 
analysis for the design of a possible nationwide U.S. RPS program. 
Why Subsidize? 
Many economists have argued that subsidizing renewable electricity generation is not an 
economically attractive approach to achieving most policy goals that have been used to justify 
such subsidies.  (Fischer and Preonas (2010) develop many of the points made in the next several 
paragraphs.)  In this section I briefly summarize the main economic arguments involved and then 
discuss a potentially important reason why such subsidies seem to be more politically attractive 
in regions served by competitive wholesale electricity markets. 
Energy Security 
Subsidizing renewables does nothing for energy security in the U.S., since North America is 
essentially self-sufficient in coal and natural gas, and only about two percent of U.S. petroleum 
consumption is used to generate electricity.  The issue is more complex in Europe, which 
depends heavily on imported natural gas.  But the output from wind and solar generation is both 
variable over time and imperfectly predictable, so that generators of both sorts are referred to as 
variable energy resources or VERs.  The greater the fraction of generation coming from VERs as 
opposed to conventional baseload coal or nuclear plants, the greater the need for gas-fired 
reserve capacity.  Thus subsidizing renewables may not be a sound response to energy security 
concerns (Moselle 2010).  (Accommodating high levels of VER generation also requires 
significant changes in system planning and operations (NERC 2009).) 
Green Growth 
Some advocates claim that such subsidies will create “green jobs.”  But the notion that the 
aggregate level of unemployment can be affected by this sort of program makes sense only under 
conditions of substantial unemployment.  Even then, however, it seems a priori unlikely that the 
most efficient way to create jobs in a deep recession would be to subsidize switching from one 
capital-intensive method of generating electricity to another.   
 Of course, subsidies for renewable generation will change the composition of domestic 
employment.  Some argue that there will be rapid growth in the global market for renewable 
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generation equipment, and subsidizing domestic demand for renewables will create a strong 
domestic industry able to compete in that market.  At its base this is an argument that the 
government has found an economically attractive investment opportunity that private capital 
markets would fail to exploit without a subsidy, an argument not well-supported by history.  
Moreover, while growth prospects for renewables may indeed be bright, particularly in the long 
term, the U.S. auto industry demonstrates that a large domestic market does not guarantee a 
healthy domestic industry (though, to be fair, it surely never hurts).  At the end of 2008, for 
instance, the U.S. led the world in installed wind generation capacity, but half of new 
installations that year were accounted for by imports. 
Climate Change 
Perhaps the strongest case for subsidizing renewables in the U.S. is that shifting away from fossil 
fuels will reduce emissions of CO2 that contribute to global climate change.  No such case can be 
made in support of the E.U.’s ambitious renewables program (discussed below), however, since 
aggregate CO2 emissions there are capped by the E.U.’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
(Ellerman et al 2010).  And in the ten U.S. states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), nine of which have RPS programs (VT is the exception), aggregate CO2 
emissions from electricity generation are likewise capped in principle, though the REGGI cap 
may not be binding in practice.  Even where caps do not exist, the key to reducing CO2 emissions 
from electricity generation is to reduce the use of coal, but coal-fired power plants generally have 
low marginal costs, and adding renewable generation to a power system results in a reduction in 
generation from plants with high marginal costs – typically gas-fired plants. 
 A related argument is that subsidies that increase output of renewables reduce the costs of 
renewable technologies via learning-by-doing and thereby encourage their widespread adoption.  
But learning exists in many industries.  It only provides an economic justification for subsidies if 
there are knowledge spillovers from one producer to others.  To my knowledge, such spillovers 
have not been demonstrated in this context, nor has it been demonstrated that costs are reduced 
more effectively by subsidizing deployment of today’s expensive technologies than by directly 
supporting research and development or offering prizes tied to generation cost.  (Such a prize 
might be a commitment to purchase a very large quantity of solar electricity at a relatively low 
FIT from the first firm willing to supply at that price.)  And in the U.S. context, I don’t believe it 
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has ever seriously been argued that any single U.S. state’s subsidies for renewables will reduce 
their costs and enough to have a discernable effect on their global penetration. 
Political Support 
Even though the strongest arguments for subsidizing renewables probably have to do with 
climate change, the first nine U.S. RPS policies were adopted before 1999 along with electric 
utility restructuring, and their political support had nothing to do with climate change or any 
other environmental issue (Hogan 2008).  (Those programs includes California’s, which was 
adopted in 2002 to replace an ineffective renewables subsidy that had been adopted in 1996 in 
connection with utility restructuring.)   
 And while climate change and other environmental concerns did play a role in the 
adoption of the second wave of RPS programs that began in 2004, support for the four most 
recently adopted U.S. RPS programs seems at best loosely connected to concern about climate 
change.  In June 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 
2454) that would have reduced U.S. CO2 emissions, despite net opposition from the delegations 
from Ohio, Missouri, and Kansas.  Nonetheless, Ohio and Missouri had adopted RPS programs 
in 2008, and Kansas, from which three of the four Representatives opposed Waxman-Markey, 
had followed suit in the month before the Waxman-Markey vote.  The 2008 statute establishing 
the Michigan RPS lists “improved air quality” as the law’s fourth purpose, after diversifying 
energy resources, providing greater energy security by using in-state resources, and promotion of 
private investment in renewable energy.  Climate change is not mentioned. 
 The fact that RPS policies have been adopted under a variety of different banners is 
consistent with studies that find that multiple factors influence their political appeal (Chandler 
2009, Lyons and Yin 2010).  States’ renewable resources, which vary enormously, do not seem 
to be a major factor, however.  As noted above, wind power has accounted for most of the 
growth in U.S. renewable generation in recent decades (Schmalensee 2010) The National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (U.S. Department of Energy, no date) estimates that seventeen 
states have annual potential wind generation more than four times their 2009 retail sales (from 
EIA).  Ten of these states have RPSs.  Eighteen states (including the District of Columbia) have 
estimated wind potential of less than ten percent of 2009 retail sales; nine of these have RPSs.   
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 To my knowledge the governance of electricity supply has not been formally considered 
a determinant of the decision to subsidize renewables, but theory and a bit of evidence suggest 
that it may be an important factor.  In states with rate-of-return regulation, utilities are entitled to 
earn a fair rate of return on their sunk investment in fossil-fueled generating plants, even if those 
plants are run less to make room for renewable generation.  Thus ratepayers must bear all the 
incremental costs of shifting to renewables that are not borne by taxpayers.  In contrast, in the 
twenty-nine states where all or most electricity is traded in organized wholesale markets 
managed by Independent System Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission Authorities (RTOs) 
and in the E.U., the returns earned by independent power producers (IPPs, generators that do not 
serve retail customers) are not guaranteed.  These profits (or, more properly, quasi-rents) can be 
expected to fall in the short run as excess capacity reduces IPPs’ output and drives down 
wholesale electricity prices.  Thus some of the short-run costs of RPS programs are shifted from 
ratepayers to generators.    
 Such a shift seems to have been important under an FIT program in Germany (Frondel et 
al 2010), and the drop in generators’ returns because of Spain’s FIT program may have been 
sufficient actually to lower retail rates (Sáenz de Miera et al 2008).  Appendix A illustrates how 
the addition of high-cost renewables under an RPS program can cause a short-run rate decline 
when fossil supply is inelastic.  In the long run, of course, ratepayers necessarily bear all the 
costs of RPS or FIT programs, but the long run does not arrive rapidly in electric power.  
 In the U.S., the 2011 reference case projection of the U.S. Energy Information Agency 
(EIA) implies that under current policy, between 2008 and 2015 U.S. electricity generation will 
increase only 3.1 percent.  Fossil-fuelled capacity is projected to rise by 2.1 percent, while 
renewable capacity is expected to increase by 23.5 percent and renewable generation to increase 
by 44.4 percent.  (The EIA projects a dramatic slowdown in renewable capacity growth after 
2015 because the main federal subsidy programs expire in that year, and projecting under 
“current policy” requires the EIA to assume that these popular programs won’t be extended.)  
Not surprisingly, U.S. generation from fossil-fueled plants is projected to decline by 2.3 percent, 
with greater declines plainly expected in states with RPS programs.  Whether these declines will 
be sufficient to lower wholesale prices is unclear, but IPP quasi-rents will surely be reduced. 
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 Whether the ability to shift some short-run costs of an RPS from ratepayers to IPPs 
makes it more or less likely that a state will adopt an RPS, all else equal, depends on IPPs’ 
political effectiveness.  Since they lack retail customers and have relatively few employees, one 
might expect them to be less politically effective than, say, comparably-sized distribution 
companies.  At any rate, that’s what the evidence suggests.  Of the sixteen states with organized 
wholesale markets in which IPPs accounted for more than thirty percent of generation in August, 
2010 (according to EIA’s Electric Power Monthly), fifteen have RPS programs.  (The exception 
is Vermont, an active supplier of renewable generation and RECs in the New England market.)  
At the other extreme, of the eleven states not in ISO/RTO regions in which IPPs account for less 
than twenty percent of generation, only three have RPS programs.  (The exceptions are New 
Mexico, North Carolina, and Washington.)   
 Particularly in multi-state organized markets, the in-state importance of IPPs is an 
imperfect measure of the ability to shift costs to IPPs, of course, and decisions regarding RPS 
programs, ISO/RTO status, and the role of IPPs are all endogenous to the political system.  This 
evidence can accordingly only be suggestive of a causal relation. 
RPS or FIT? 
Most analysts seem to believe that price-based FIT policies are superior to quantity-based RPS 
approaches.   The European Commission (2008, p. 3; italics in original) has neatly summarized 
the general view: “well-adapted feed in tariff regimes are generally the most efficient and 
effective support schemes for promoting renewable energy.” 
 This conclusion rests in part on experience in the E.U., where FIT regimes in, e.g., Spain 
and Germany, outperformed the RPS regime in the U.K., though siting problems in the U.K. and 
the success of the RPS policy in Texas suggest that the relation between these policies in practice 
is more complex.  The clearest theoretical argument for FIT’s superiority is that guaranteeing the 
price removes electricity market risk from investors in renewable generation, so that more capital 
can be raised per dollar of subsidy expense.  But this “bang for the buck” measure neglects 
impacts on other actors besides investors in renewables and those who pay subsidies.  Devices 
for that remove market risk from one set of players may simply shift it to others and not reduce 
risk to society as a whole.  There is accordingly no obvious reason why overall social risk cannot 
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be higher under an RPS than an FIT, but overall social risk seems to have received little 
analytical attention. 
 Appendix B presents a simple model that illustrates that total social risk, as measured by 
the variance of the total cost to society of meeting the (inelastic) demand for electricity, may be 
higher under a FIT than under a comparable RPS, even though individual investors bear no risk 
under an RPS.  In a very stylized, long-run model of a large electric power system with fixed 
total load, I compare an RPS and an FIT that would have the same cost and deliver the same 
generation mix under certainty.  Fossil generation at the system level is assumed to operate under 
constant returns to scale with known costs, while the supply curve of renewable energy is 
assumed to be rising (because potential sites vary in quality), and the quantity supplied at any 
price is assumed to be ex ante uncertain.  The model shows that as long as the unit cost of 
renewables is always higher than the unit cost of fossil electricity, the variance of the total cost of 
serving the fixed load, a natural measure of total social risk, is always higher under FIT than 
RPS.  The difference is greater the more elastic is the renewables supply curve, since what drives 
the result is uncertainty regarding the quality supplied (and subsidized) under an FIT policy.   
 There are, of course, obvious design features that can reduce the riskiness of both types 
of policy.  FIT regimes could have a fixed maximum quantity eligible for the subsidy, for 
instance, and RPS regimes could have a cap on total costs.  It is interesting that FIT regimes in 
the E.U. have generally not had quantity limits (Couture et al 2010), and some have experienced 
significant positive quantity surprises, while nine of the 30 U.S. RPS programs have explicit cost 
caps.  These caps limit RPS-induced retail rate increases to between one and four percent.  (One 
of the nine cost-cap states, Montana also sets the penalty for non-compliance at $10 per MWh, 
effectively ruling out purchase of expensive renewable power.) 
 I hasten to add that I doubt that considerations of social risk explain why, despite 
experience in the E.U. and the weight of expert opinion, U.S. states have overwhelmingly chosen 
RPS over FIT to subsidize renewable generation.  States may have bad memories of their 
experience under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, which required 
them to purchase renewable generation at utilities “avoided cost,” thereby establishing an FIT-
like regime.  Or they may have been reluctant to attempt to set wholesale rates for renewable 
power, given FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale power rates.  But the FERC first opined on a 
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(very limited) state FIT in October, 2010 (133 FERC ¶ 61,059 2010).  And neither of these 
considerations explains the complete lack of interest in FIT approaches at the federal level.   
 It is thus something of a puzzle why U.S. politicians so strongly prefer RPS to FIT.  
Perhaps quantity goals are generally more attractive than price goals, as the universal use of the 
former rather than the latter in international climate change negotiations might suggest.  Or 
perhaps, more cynically, it may be easier to get RPS programs adopted where environmental 
groups are only moderately strong because the costs of RPS programs are less visible than the 
costs of FIT programs.  It is not hard to find Americans who think wind and solar power must be 
cheap because their “fuel” is free; I expect it is more difficult to find Spaniards or Germans who 
share this mistaken belief. 
Is the E.U. Renewables Program Ex-Post Efficient? 
 The notion of ex-post efficiency, explored in this section and the next, involves taking detailed 
policy goals as given and asking whether they are likely to be attained at minimum cost or 
anything close to it.  In the case of renewable energy this mainly requires production at the best 
sites, given the technologies required or allowed to be employed. 
 The goals of the E.U.’s renewable energy program are simply stated: twenty percent of 
overall energy and ten percent of energy used in transportation must come from renewable 
sources by 2020 (European Union 2009).  The relevant directive defines “renewable” fairly 
broadly and argues, plausibly, that because transportation fuels are freely traded, there is no 
reason why the same ten percent requirement should not apply to all member states. 
 Ex post efficiency as regards the top-line twenty percent target requires E.U.-wide 
equalization of the marginal cost of producing electricity from renewable energy.  Assuming no 
within-country inefficiencies, this goal could be attained in at least three ways.  First, a uniform 
E.U.-wide subsidy or FIT regime could be employed – and, to hit the overall renewable-share 
target, adjusted as information about quantities supplied emerged.  Second, almost any set of 
national goals could be specified, as long as a system of RECs tradable E.U.-wide was in place.  
Finally, of course, even without international trading, a set of national goals could lead to ex-post 
efficiency if they were carefully set so as to equalize marginal cost of compliance across 
countries.  Of course, even if a set of national renewable-share targets is met exactly, unless 
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those targets are identical, different patterns of national growth rates will lead to different shares 
of renewables for the E.U. as a whole. 
 A Union-wide subsidy scheme seems not to have received serious attention, perhaps 
because member states were attached to their existing array of FIT regimes, but there was a good 
deal of debate within the E.U. about establishment of a Union-wide REC system (Toke 2008).  
In the end, however, in part because of protests from Germany and Spain, along with their 
renewable energy industries, the final directive allowed for only limited government-to-
government trading as well as joint projects. 
 As noted above, limits on international trading would not lead to appreciable ex-post 
inefficiency if national targets were carefully chosen to ensure that marginal costs of compliance 
were roughly equal.  But the E.U.’s statement of its target-setting procedure suggests at least as 
much concern with equity as with efficiency: 
It is appropriate [to share] the required total increase in the use of energy from 
renewable sources between Member States on the basis of an equal increase in 
each Member State’s share weighted by their GDP, modulated to reflect their 
starting points, and by … [taking account of] Member States’ past efforts with 
regard to the use of energy from renewable sources. (European Union 2009, ¶15) 
 To get some sense of the relative importance of national wealth in the target-setting 
process relative to other factors, I performed the following simple exercise.  The Directive (in 
Annex 1) gives for each Member State the 2005 share of its energy from renewables (C) and its 
2020 target (T).  For each State (excluding Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta for various reasons) 
I computed two measures of the toughness of its target: an absolute measure, (T-C), and a 
relative measure, (T-C)/C.  Four nations were in the top third of Member States according to 
both measures – Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Ireland – and four nations were in 
the bottom third according to both measures – Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.  The 
2005 per-capita GDP of the poorest country in the top group was more than 3.3 times that of the 
richest country in the bottom group.  Clearly ability to pay had an important role, perhaps the 
dominant role, in the determination of national targets. 
 Not surprisingly, two independent studies have concluded that the cost of restricting 
international trading, given the national targets chosen, is substantial: about  €17 billion annually 
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in 2020, roughly twenty percent of the cost with unlimited trading (Eurelectric 2009).  The 
contrast with the E.U.’s pioneering ETS for capping Union-wide carbon dioxide emissions 
efficiently could hardly be stronger (Ellerman et al 2010). 
Are the U.S. State RPS Programs Ex-Post Efficient? 
Since states make independent political decisions regarding RPS programs, and, as I noted 
above, the presence of RPS programs seems unrelated to the availability of renewable resources, 
it is extremely unlikely that state RPS targets equalize the marginal cost of renewable generation.  
Total national costs of the meeting states’ aggregate targets could nonetheless be minimized, at 
least with respect to the twenty-seven REC-using states, if all RECs were nationally traded in 
efficient, competitive markets.  (The three states that do not use RECs are New York (which uses 
a system of centralized procurement), Iowa (which requires ownership of or contracts with 
specific facilities), and Hawaii (where the statue simply makes no mention of RECs).)  
Unfortunately, as I show in the rest of this section, there there are enormous obstacles to both 
interstate trade and market efficiency.    
 No two of the thirty U.S, RPS programs are identical, and the differences are often 
substantial.  Some programs appear highly ambitious, others much less so.  Iowa, for instance, 
simply requires its utilities to own or contract with 105 MW of renewable generation capacity, 
even though there are currently 3,675 MW of wind generation capacity in the state (AWEA n.d.).  
Most states specify an alternative compliance payment (ACP) for each MWh by which load-
serving entities fall short of meeting their requirements, but ten appear to leave enforcement to 
the discretion of their public utility commissions.  Most ACPs are around $50/MWh, but some 
are as low as $10, and those relating to solar-specific requirements are much higher, with the 
New Jersey solar ACP highest at $675/MWh.  Normally if there are not enough RECs available 
to meet utilities’ requirements in a given year, one would expect the corresponding REC price to 
approximate the ACP.  If such a shortage ever develops in RECs eligible to satisfy the Missouri 
RPS it will be interesting to see what happens, since the Missouri ACP is specified by statute as 
twice the REC price. 
 No two states use the same definition of “renewable,” and twenty operate under laws that 
set multiple tiers or classes of technology-specific requirements.  Renewable energy sources like 
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geothermal or municipal biomass produce predictable generation, while at substantial penetration 
variable energy resources (VERs) sources like wind and solar require additional reserve capacity 
and changes in system operations and, in some cases, are sited remotely and require large 
investments in transmission capacity (NERC 2009; National Research Council 2010, ch. 6).  No 
state RPS program systematically dis-favors VERs, however.  In fact, twelve programs have 
specific requirements for the use of solar energy, and, as noted above, wind has accounted for the 
bulk of increases in renewable generation in recent years.  If use of all technologies designated 
“renewable” are thought to produce equal benefits, it follows that it would reduce total social 
costs if policy favored technologies that imposed fewer external costs on the balance of electric 
power systems. 
 Some features of RPS programs are clearly aimed at promoting in-state economic 
activity.  Texas and other states give credit only for renewable generation that serves in-state 
customers, for instance, and New Jersey has requirements for in-state solar generation and, 
effective in 2011, for in-state off-shore wind.  North Carolina has minimum requirements for 
electricity generated using swine waste and using poultry waste. 
 In-state solar requirements, particularly when coupled with requirements for distributed 
generation, seem aimed at generating jobs installing and maintaining solar cells rather than 
manufacturing them.  According to the EIA, in 2008 Ohio and Michigan accounted for sixty-one 
percent of solar cells manufactured in the U.S., and California and Massachusetts accounted for 
another twenty percent.  Of these four, only Ohio and Massachusetts had solar RPS 
requirements.  No solar cells at all were produced in five states with solar requirements, and 
there was some production in six states without solar requirements.  
 Other requirements are somewhat harder to understand.  For instance, both the District of 
Columbia and New Hampshire allow RECs from renewable generators over a fairly wide 
geographic area to be used for compliance.  Nonetheless the District of Columbia has three 
technology-specific requirements within its overall RPS, and New Hampshire has four.  These 
can have very little to do with in-state generation, particularly in the District of Columbia.  At 
most these technology-specific requirements could have some minor impact on the region-wide 
renewable generation mix.  It seems implausible that they could have been expected to have a 
measurable effect on aggregate learning-by-doing in any market area. 
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Interstate Trade in RECs 
To assess whether the states’ goals for renewable generation, whatever their merits, are met 
reasonably efficiently, it is necessary to understand the mechanics of RPS programs.  In the 
twenty-seven REC-using states, each state must certify that RECs produced along with 
electricity by particular generating facilities can be used for compliance with one or more state-
specific requirements.  The generation, transfer, and retirement of RECs are generally tracked in 
online registries (http://www.etnna.org/learn.html).  All information in these registries is treated 
as proprietary and is only available to market participants.   This is in stark contrast to the 
emissions trading systems administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in which 
all such information is public 
(http://camddataandmaps.epa.gov/gdm/index.cfm?fuseaction=prepackaged.progressresults_allow
ance).  RECs are often bundled with electricity in long-term arrangements between generators 
and distribution companies; a number of brokers facilitate over-the-counter trades of 
“unbundled” RECs; and aggregators assemble RECs from multiple sources to meet utilities’ 
requirements. (A list of brokers and other  
participants in these markets is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy: 
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/certificates.shtml?page=2.)   Most (but not all) 
states use a calendar-year compliance period, allowing a few months after the end of the year for 
load-serving entities to acquire and turn over the necessary number of RECs.   
 Colorado and Missouri allow RECs purchased from certified generators anywhere in the 
US to be used for compliance purposes, but both give twenty-five percent additional credit for 
in-state generation.  Of the remaining twenty-five REC-using programs, fifteen will accept REC 
from facilities that do not deliver power in-state, but eligible facilities typically must be located 
in the same ISO or RTO or in the same geographic region.  Washington only accepts RECs from 
the Pacific Northwest, for instance, and Deleware accepts RECs only from the PJM RTO.   
 On the other hand, distribution companies in at least some of the fifteen states that allow 
inter-state trading and generators there and elsewhere do engage in substantial interstate (and 
even international) trade in RECs.  Because information in the various REC registries is treated 
as proprietary, no systematic data on interstate transfers of RECs are available.  However, Table 
1 shows that the few state compliance reports that do provide such data show substantial imports.  
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In Table 1, it is worth noting that Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia do not have RPS 
programs, and Michigan’s wasn’t enacted until 2008.   
Table 1.  
RPS Compliance Using Out-of-State Generation 
Percentage
State REC, Year Out of State Main Sources
Connecticut Class I, 2007 97.5 Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York
Connecticut Class II, 2007 43.6 Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont
Maryland Tiers I & II, CY2007 83.7 Pennsylvania, Virginia, Michigan
Massachusetts 2008 90.0 New York, Maine, New Hampshire, Quebec
New Jersey Class I, RY2009 85.4 Illinois, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia
New Jersey Class II, RY2009 54.4 Pennsylvania, Maryland
Rhode Island New, 2008 91.9 New Hampshire, New York, Vermont
Rhode Island Existing, 2008 100.0 Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire
Notes : Data from most recent state compliance reports available online in mid‐November, 2010. 
 "CY" and "RY" refer to compliance year and reporting year, respectively.  Massachusetts had only
one RPS requirement in 2008; in 2009 it was renamed Class I and a Class II requirement was added.
Definitions of technologies covered by the RECs shown may be found in http://www.dsireusa.org.
 
REC Market Fragmentation and Transactions Costs  
It is possible to get some information on REC prices, though only in the over-the-counter market.  
I have purchased end-of-month bid-ask data from May, 2006 through August, 2010 from 
Spectron, a leading broker.  Figures 1-3 below also rely on bid-offer data for earlier months that 
had been made public by Evolution Markets, another leading broker.  In May, 2006, Spectron 
provided quotes on RECs from only five states (Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and Texas), and Evolution Markets covered only one additional state (Maine).  Over 
time, as I discuss just below, coverage has expanded as RPS programs have spread. 
 Looking at the raw price data, one is first struck by the wide range of REC prices.  On 
August 31, 2010, for instance, all bids for solar RECs for New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Delaware, and Ohio were at least $300/MWh, while other, non-solar bids and offers ranged from 
$.05 to $35.00.  This extreme price dispersion is inconsistent with ex post efficiency in meeting 
states’ goals for renewable generation and, as I show next, it reflects results in markets that are 
fragmented and thin, with high transactions costs.  Moreover, I then show that price movements 
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in a few relatively thick REC markets for which information on supply and demand conditions is 
available publicly with a lag strongly suggest that traders in these markets do not have good 
private information.   
 Of the twenty-seven REC-using state RPS programs, seven have requirements that begin 
in 2010 or a later year.  As of June, 2010, Spectron provided quotes for RECs in only half of the 
remaining twenty states.  Three more were added by August.  Presumably there was insufficient 
trading volume in the other states’ RECs to make it worthwhile even to post bid-ask quotes with 
wide spreads.  Because most states’ RPS programs have multiple requirements, at the end of 
August, 2010, Spectron provided quotes for thirty-three different RECs from the thirteen states it 
covered.  
 These markets are further fragmented because RECs can be banked only for a limited 
time except in Arizona and Oregon.  (Neither Evolution Markets nor Spectron provided quotes 
for RECs from either state during any month in my sample.)   Colorado allows banking for five 
years, and Ohio and Wisconsin allow banking for four years.  Most of the other REC-using 
programs allow banking for only two or three years.  Limiting banking reduces the incentive for 
early investment in large-scale generation, of course, and it also makes RECs produced in 
different years imperfect substitutes and thus further fragment markets.  In August, 2010, 
Spectron provided bid-offer quotes for an average of two different vintages per REC, for a total 
of sixty-six different markets.   (Over the whole May, 2006 to August, 2010 period the average 
of vintages quoted per REC was essentially the same.) 
 Fragmented, thin markets lead to high transactions costs, as market-makers need to quote 
high bid-ask spreads to cover illiquidity risks.  Over all the Spectron data, the average bid-ask 
spread for the current-year vintage was thirty-eight percent.  By way of comparison, spreads for 
municipal and corporate bonds in 1995-97, when both were also traded in fragmented, broker-
mediated, over the counter markets, averaged 0.23 percent and 0.21 percent, respectively 
(Chakravarty and Sarkar 2003).  Spreads of one hundred percent or more are not uncommon in 
the Spectron REC data: there were ten in the sixty-six quotes posted on August 31, 2010, for 
instance. 
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Information and Market Efficiency 
If participants in REC markets had good, current information and if there were no banking, one 
would expect to see a bimodal distribution of current vintage spot market prices, particularly 
toward the end of each compliance period, as uncertainties about renewable generation and REC 
requirements were resolved.  If the market were expected to be long at the end of the compliance 
period, with more than enough RECs produced to meet RPS requirements, the price should tend 
to zero.  (This is basically what happened in the E.U. ETS at the end of the first compliance 
period (Ellerman et al 2010).)  On the other hand, if the market were expected to be short, with 
fewer RECs produced than required, one would expect REC prices to tend to near the ACP level.  
If some banking is allowed, prices should tend to some positive number, well below the ACP, if 
the market is expected to be long, particularly if it is expected to stay that way for a year or more, 
but prices should still be near the ACP level if the market is short.   
 If no interstate trading is allowed, it should be relatively simple for market participants, 
including brokers, to learn whether the market was likely to be long or short at the end of each 
compliance period, particularly if the relevant authorities regularly and promptly published 
information on market conditions.  New Jersey’s solar requirement, for instance, can only be met 
by in-state generation; New Jersey publishes detailed reports on ACP payments, market 
conditions, and their determinants; and these reports appear promptly, at least compared to the 
reports of other states.  (A draft of the report for Reporting Year 2009, which ended on May 31, 
2009, was produced in February, 2010.)  These reports show a market that has been consistently 
and substantially short and, not surprisingly, New Jersey solar RECs (called SRECs) consistently 
trade just below the ACP level in a fairly liquid market: spreads in the Spectron data averaged 
6.1 percent.  These prices appear to have tracked the fundamentals in this market well. 
 On the other hand, of the eight REC-using states with compliance requirements 
beginning in 2009 and earlier that only count RECs from facilities that deliver power in-state, 
seven do not seem to publish any information about REC market conditions.  Only Texas (via its 
grid operator, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)) has such information readily 
available on line.  The Texas reports are detailed and prompt relative to other states: the Texas 
report for calendar 2009 was available online by mid-November, 2010.  These reports show a 
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market that has been long by a substantial margin since its inception, with planned wind capacity 
increases likely to prolong this state of affairs.    
 Figure 1 shows current-vintage REC market prices that are not easily reconciled with 
these fundamentals: REC prices remained substantial (though low relative to the $50 ACP level) 
until 2006.  (This Figure and those below show arithmetic means of bid and ask prices.)  It has 
been suggested that market participants were building REC banks through 2006 to deal with 
uncertainty, particularly about the future of the federal production tax credit.  (In the 1999-2004 
period, the production tax credit lapsed three times (National Research Council 2010, p. 148).)  
While this is described by participants as an active market, current-vintage bid-ask spreads in the 
Spectron data averaged 37%. 
 
Source: See text.  Qualifying renewable energy facilities must have been installed 
after September 1999; eligible energy sources include solar, wind, geothermal, 
hydroelectric, wave or tidal energy, biomass, or biomass-based waste products, 
including landfill gas. 
 Things are more complicated in principle when interstate trading is allowed. RECs 
produced by a wind farm in Vermont, say, can be used to satisfy RPS requirements in any other 
New England state.  A good deal of information on renewable generation in several states and 
Canadian provinces, along with information on RPS requirements and REC banks throughout 
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New England would be required for a generation facility or distribution company in, say, Rhode 
Island to have a well-informed view of the likely future REC prices it would face.   
 It is possible that the necessary information can be acquired by sophisticated traders from 
REC registries and other sources, but the states involved do not do much to help.  Of the twelve 
states that allowed RECs produced by facilities that did not deliver power in-state to be used for 
compliance and that required compliance beginning in 2009 or earlier, four do not seem to post 
comprehensive RPS program reports.  The reports of the other eight vary considerably in 
promptness: as of mid-November, 2010, only three states had posted reports dealing with all or 
part of 2009, while the most recent reports from three other states covered 2007.  These reports 
also provide very different amounts of information.  Several provide only ACP data, and only a 
few provide enough information from which one could assess market conditions. 
 Markets for Massachusetts and Connecticut RECs have been among the more active, and 
their state reports were among the more informative (though Connecticut’s have not been 
particularly prompt), so one can compare current-vintage REC prices with market fundamentals.  
Figure 2 shows these prices for Massachusetts Class I RECs.  Spreads in this market averaged 
8.2 percent in the Spectron data and were generally lower before 2008.  This market was short in 
the 2003-06 period, with twenty-six percent of compliance in 2006 taking the form of ACP 
payments.  In 2007, however, the market was long: banking amounted to five percent of 
requirements.  The market remained long in subsequent years.  It seems clear from Figure 2 that 
it took market participants essentially all of 2007 to realize that the market was no longer short. 
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Source: See text.  Qualifying renewable energy facilities must have been installed 
after 1997; eligible energy sources include solar, wind, geothermal, ocean 
(thermal, wave, or tidal), fuel cells using renewable fuels, landfill gas, certain 
hydroelectric facilities, and low-emission advanced biomass conversion 
technologies. 
 
 Figure 3 shows prices for Connecticut Class I RECs, for which bid-ask spreads averaged 
11.7 percent in the Spectron data.  This market was long in 2004 and 2005, twelve percent short 
in 2006 (the ACP was $55), and 0.2 percent short in 2007.  Prices seem to have been 
inexplicably high until mid-2005, then so low during 2006 that participants must have been 
unaware of the impending shortage.  After significant ACP payments were required for 2006, 
prices finally jumped in early 2007 to levels reflecting a short market. 
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Figure 2.  Current Vintage REC Prices ‐ Massachusetts Class I
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Source: see text.  Eligible energy sources (regardless of when facilities were built) 
include solar, wind, fuel cells (any fuel), landfill gas, ocean (thermal, wave, or 
tidal), certain hydroelectric facilities, low emission advanced renewable facilities, 
and sustainable biomass facilities.     
Summary & Implications 
This essay has examined a number of aspects of policies to subsidize the generation of electricity 
from renewable energy.  Analysts generally agree that such policies are not an efficient way to 
reduce CO2 emissions.  Their appeal derives from other sources, one of which, I argued above, is 
the ability in competitive electricity markets to impose some or all of the attendant costs on 
generators rather than ratepayers, at least in the short run.  The incidence of RPS policies in the 
U.S. is at least consistent with this argument. 
 Globally, the FIT approach is more popular than the RPS approach, importantly, it seems 
because the FIT approach removes risk from investors in renewable generation.  But removing 
risk from investors may serve mainly to shift it to other actors and not to reduce risk to society as 
a whole.  I presented a simple model showing that the long-run risk to society as a whole may in 
fact generally be lower under the RPS approach, at least unless steps are taken to limit the range 
of possible renewable generation levels under an FIT regime.  This possibility has surely not 
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helped make the RPS approach much more popular than the FIT approach in the U.S., but it is 
not apparent what  has done so.  
 Because CO2 emissions in the E.U. are capped by the E.U. ETS, the E.U.’s policy to 
increase its use of renewable energy can have no effect on those emissions.  Moreover, national 
targets under the E.U. renewables policy are systematically more challenging for wealthier 
countries, so that the policy’s limits on international REC trading seems highly likely to inflate 
its costs – as others’ detailed analysis has confirmed. 
 Finally, in the U.S. some state RPS goals seem mainly to be about local job creation, 
while the environmental or other rationales for some other states goals are not simply obvious.  
Because most states have multiple technology- or location-specific goals and all but two states 
limit banking, REC markets are fragmented and thin, and transactions costs are quite high.  Most 
states limit interstate trading and provide little information from which one could infer REC 
market conditions, and even in relatively active markets REC prices are sometimes markedly out 
of line with their fundamental determinants. 
 As noted at the beginning of this essay, bills that would impose a nationwide RPS have 
twice passed the U.S. House of Representatives since 2007.  The findings in the preceding 
section, along with the experience with the U.S. acid rain program (Ellerman et al 2000) and the 
E.U. ETS (Ellerman et al 2010) have clear implications for the design of any federal program 
that would impose quantitative requirements for clean and/or renewable electricity generation.  
First any such program should pre-empt state RPS regimes and should allow unlimited 
nationwide REC trading.  A state standard tighter than the federal standard would likely have no 
effect on the national generation mix and would in any case raise in-state and national costs 
(Goulder and Stavins 2011).   Second, to avoid market fragmentation, there should be only one 
class of REC.  Technology-specific multipliers could be used to penalize some VER 
technologies for the costs they impose on the electric power system or, perhaps, to reward some 
technologies because of the perceived external effect of induced learning-by-doing if their 
production is increased.  Finally, unlimited banking should be allowed both to reward early 
large-scale investment and to avoid fragmenting REC markets by vintage, and information on 
market condition (including levels of REC banks) should be compiled and provided quickly to 
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market participants.  And, of course, as in other U.S. emissions trading programs, information on 
quantities of RECs held and traded should be publicly available. 
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Appendix A 
To see how electric rates could fall even though ratepayers pay a premium for incremental 
renewable generation, consider a simple system with fixed load Q.  Let R be the quantity of 
renewable generation added to the system, let r be its per-unit average cost, net of any tax-
financed subsidy, let s(Q-R) be the short-run supply curve of fossil generation, and let T be total 
payments by ratepayers for electricity.  If the marginal cost of renewable generation is zero, T 
must equal the cost of renewables, rR, plus the payments to fossil generators necessary to induce 
them to supply (Q-R), so  
    T = rR + (Q-R)s(Q-R).   
 Now consider a mandate that increases R slightly.  Because Q-R must fall and the fossil 
supply curve is upward sloping, the wholesale market price must fall and thus the quasi-rents of 
fossil generators are cut.  Moreover, it is immediate that  
25 
 
    dT/dR = (r - s) –  s/,  
where  is the fossil elasticity of supply and s is the wholesale price of electricity, equal to the 
marginal cost of fossil generation.  The less elastic is fossil supply, all else equal, the more likely 
it is that increasing R lowers T, so that that fossil generators bear more than the full cost of 
increasing renewables in the short run.  See Fischer (2009) for a much more complete discussion. 
Appendix B 
In a large electric power system, it seems reasonable to assume that the long-run unit cost of 
fossil-generated power, cf, is roughly independent of system scale, but it is likely to be higher the 
greater the penetration of renewable VERs:  
       
where Qr and Qf are the quantities of renewable and fossil generation, respectively, and  and  
are positive constants.  The supply curve of renewable generation is assumed to rise because sites 
vary in quality and to be uncertain ex ante: 
      
where  and  are positive constants, and   is a random variable with mean zero.  Total load, Q 
is assumed fixed for simplicity; the argument below goes through if it also has an additive 
stochastic component. 
 We want to compare an FIT of T with an RPS of R that is equivalent under certainty (i.e., 
when  = 0), so we assume .T R     Under certainty, the total social cost of electricity under 
either policy is 
   
 When uncertainty is present, pr is stochastic under the RPS, and total social cost is simply 
       
Under the FIT, Qr is stochastic when uncertainty is present, and a bit of algebra yields 
      
   ( ) .r r f rC p Q c Q Q T R Q R       
  .FITC C R    
      
 / ,f r fc Q Q  
.RPSC C R 
,r rp Q    
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Note that positive values of   (positive cost shocks to renewables) raise the cost of an RPS but, 
by reducing quantity supplied, lower the cost of an FIT.  The key point here is that as long as  + 
 > , so that the full incremental cost of renewable electricity always exceeds the incremental 
cost of fossil electricity, the variance of total social cost is higher under FIT than under RPS.  All 
else equal the difference is larger the smaller is , that is, the flatter is the renewable supply 
curve and thus the more responsive the quantity of renewables is to cost shocks when price is 
fixed, as it is under an FIT. 
 
 
 
 
